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SNAPSHOT July 13, 2018
Family Separation and the
Triumph of Cruelty
The Moral Cost of the Immigration Crisis
Sometime in 1940, an 11-year-old refugee
named Yudita Nisse reached the United States on a
boat from Japan. Her Latvian-Jewish family had fled
Nazi Germany east across the Soviet Union; the trip to
North America was to have completed their escape. But
the family had no legal authorization to enter the
United States, so on arrival in Seattle they were locked
up as illegal immigrants. They were eventually
released, and Yudita later Anglicized her first name,
becoming Judith. A second name change when she
married made her Judith Shklar, and by that name she
became the first woman ever to receive tenure in
Harvard’s government department and one of the most
formidable political theorists of her generation.
Shklar’s work focused on cruelty. Her ideas offer a
window onto the morality of the current crisis at the
U.S.-Mexican border. Cruelty, in Shklar’s conception,
is the deliberate infliction of pain or humiliation by a
strong party on a powerless one in order to cause
anguish or fear. The policy of separating children
crossing the border from their parents seems to
qualify. The immigrants are in a powerless position—
the children especially so. Given that the Trump
administration has defended the policy as a deterrent—
a warning to other would-be immigrants—it is safe to
conclude that the families’ anguish is a deliberate goal
of the policy, rather than merely a byproduct. And
although Shklar focused on the infliction of physical
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pain, her analysis extends to the profound emotional
and psychological pain that the forced family
separations impose. 
THE COSTS OF CRUELTY
Shklar saw cruelty as not just a matter of personal
immorality but also as a leading threat to liberal
democratic government. A precondition for liberalism,
in her view, was the ability of citizens to live free from
fear and humiliation. Fear is the condition of the
person subject to arbitrary power, the refugee on the
run from violence, the parent with no food for his or
her child. People in these circumstances cannot
function as the citizens that liberal government
requires. Heroic exceptions aside, they cannot plan,
trust, deliberate, or give due attention to the rights of
others at the expense of their own immediate needs. A
government that keeps people in fear governs a
country where liberalism is impossible. So Shklar’s
form of liberalism—what she called the liberalism of
fear—insists that governments deploy and limit their
power so as to prevent fear and humiliation. Shklar did
not seek a world without cruelty: she knew that
government enables people to exercise power and that,
given human nature, officials with power will
sometimes exercise it cruelly. (She also knew that
humans cannot do without government.) But cruelty’s
tendency to undermine the foundations of liberal
citizenship marked it as a vice to be constantly guarded
against.
Some political theorists have taken the contrary view
that government must sometimes act cruelly by choice.
Niccolò Machiavelli counseled that cruelty is
sometimes indispensable and perhaps even virtuous,
when properly applied. In a more utilitarian vein,
many thinkers have believed that cruelty is, in the end,
just another sort of egg-breaking that making omelets
sometimes requires. To see the difference between
these perspectives and Shklar’s, it is profitable to think
about both the costs of cruelty and the expected
benefits of cruel policies. 
On the benefit side, a politician who saw himself as a
master of events might feel certain about the results
that a chosen policy would bring. Taking bold steps, he
would reason, can bring about great results. A
politician with greater humility and an awareness of
the complexities of the world might be less certain that
the aimed-for good will materialize. And the less
confident one is that one’s policies will bring about the
desired ends, the more hesitant one should be to
conclude that causing fear and anguish will prove
worth it in the end. Politicians may wind up causing
fear and anguish for nothing, or at least for less than
they thought they were getting. 
On the cost side, an illiberal politician does not worry
about destroying the conditions for liberal citizenship.
But beyond that, a political theorist of a more
aristocratic or less humanitarian bent might value the
well-being of victims less than a liberal or a
humanitarian theorist would, especially if those
victims were ordinary people. And to the extent that
such a framework valorizes strength, power, and glory,
the fear and pain of the victims is all the more tolerable
—precisely because they are weak. 
Cruelty was the first political vice in Shklar’s thought
because of its effects on its victims, but a full account of
cruelty also takes into account the emotions of the
perpetrators. In its strongest forms, cruelty is gleeful.
One of the most important moments in the public
narrative of the abuse of the captives at Abu Ghraib
prison was the emergence of a photograph of Lynndie
England, an American soldier, grinning with positive
enjoyment at the humiliation of Iraqi prisoners. Not all
instances of cruelty are gleeful: a bureaucracy can be
cruel. What matters is that the victim is powerless and
that the perpetrator does not see the victim’s fear or
humiliation as a reason to change his or her actions.
As applied to current U.S. policy at the border, this 
perspective on cruelty raises at least four points. The 
first is the cruelty of some parts of the policy. Forcibly 
separating parents and children puts both in a state of 
fear, and many of the officials behind the policy of 
separation have done little to suggest that they wish it 
weren’t so. The second concerns the danger of 
justifying cruelty as a necessary aspect of deterrence, 
as some U.S. officials have done. All governments need 
to deter law-breaking, and even harsh policies are 
sometimes necessary deterrents. But if one does not 
empathize with the pain of the victim, it is only too 
easy to believe that unnecessary cruelties are, in fact, 
necessary ones. (The murder of Astyanax, Hector’s 
infant son, was justified by the Greek warriors who 
killed him as prudential.) If one despises the weak—as 
President Donald Trump manifestly does—one will set 
little value on their suffering, so a policy that causes 
such suffering can be justified even if it produces only 
moderate benefits. The problem is all the greater if 
policymakers also overestimate the simplicity of the 
world and their power to change it, because they will 
think that the pain they cause really will bring about 
the greater good that is supposed to justify it. Third, 
cruel behavior affects the perspective of the 
perpetrator. Once one starts behaving cruelly, it is only 
a short distance to thinking of the victims as 
fundamentally different from oneself, either in their 
moral status as human beings or in their capacity to 
feel pain. It might be hard to continue with the policy 
otherwise. Once a politician starts thinking that way, 
the thought might be hard to limit. 
Finally, as Shklar argued, cruelty destroys the basis for
liberal government. This might not seem to matter to a
government that behaves cruelly only toward people
who are not citizens, and who it hopes never will be.
Why should Americans care if foreigners are treated in
a way that destroys their capacity to exercise American
citizenship? But cruelty is not only a political vice: it is
also a vice of character. Politicians who readily deploy
cruelty in one arena risk deploying it elsewhere too. It
is not clear that the Trump administration is so full of
empathy toward the weak among its own citizens, or so
free of the cowardice and aristocratic assurance that
often nurtures cruelty, that it will be disciplined about
behaving cruelly only toward would-be immigrants
and sparing Americans.
